SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: NEW FINANCE OR NEW PROCUREMENT?

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Abstract: Over the last years, the Social Impact Bond (SIB) model has emerged as a new and innovative way for financing social programs. This work aims to assess the extent to which SIB model actually realizes its potential to overcome some of the shortcomings characterizing the public purchasing of social services. Therefore, the analysis has considered two aspects, which may affect the design and implementation of a Social Impact Bond: the specific needs of a policy maker in organizing the provision of social services and the social problem the services intend to tackle.

After having (a) identified the motivations, which coexist in triggering the creation of a SIB and (b) several dimensions, which characterize the SIB design, the study, provides a review of the experiences in which the SIB model has been already applied, exploring the specific configuration used.

Then, the study investigates the relationship between (c) how a SIB has been designed and the motivations that have triggered its development; (d) how a SIB has been designed and the social issue the SIB tries to solve. Lastly, considering the prevalent outline in a social sector, it will be discussed the ability of the SIB scheme to reform the social procurement practice.


Introduction

The different dynamics that have characterized the last decade – the emergence of new and increasingly acute social needs and the call for solutions to increase the sustainability of social spending (Karanikolos, Mladovsky, Cylus, Thomson, Basu, Stuckler, Mackenbach & McKee, 2013; Vis, Kersbergen & Hylands, 2011) – push for transforming the public approach in delivering or purchasing social services. Therefore, policy makers started to look at third sector organizations as well as private sector companies, as viable outsourcers, with a potential of being more efficient and effective than their public sector counterparts (Allen, 2009; Millar, 2012). Indeed, some distinctive qualities, such as “flexibility, ability to innovate, closeness to and understanding of the needs of specialist client groups and the exhibition of an ethos of care that might involve going well beyond the basic requirement of contract” (Rees, 2014), justify the broad involvement of the third sector in public service delivery.

However, the relationship between public sector and third sector organizations is not without difficulties for both sides. On the one hand, the public sector complains an insufficient competition among voluntary sector service providers; difficulties in measuring performance and accountability; and higher transaction costs related to human resources and information technology (Martikke & Moxham, 2010).
On the other hand, social sector organizations denounce a low involvement in the specification and re-design of services and are becoming impatient with the constraints of traditional command and control, target setting and related monitoring. Moreover, they experience frustration about being contingent on the unpredictability of constant policy change (Rees, 2014).

In this context, the Social Impact Bond (SIB) model, as one of the instruments of impact investing may represent a possible answer to the problem of funding service delivery, at the same time fostering efficiency, effectiveness and innovation (Fox & Albertson, 2011). SIB can be considered a new and innovative way for financing social programs, introducing a new type of public-private partnership to provide social (goods and) services (Jackson, 2013; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013). In details, SIB is a financing mechanism aimed to fund preventive interventions relying on an outcome-based contract.

Despite their name, Social Impact Bonds are not strictly bonds (Warner, 2013). They can be better described as hybrid instruments including elements of both equity and debt (Bolton and Savell, 2010; Liebman, 2011;). In this model, investors, through a financial intermediary, provide an amount to finance a certain social service aimed to reach an outcome that is of interest to a government commissioner. If the provided services achieve the agreed social benefits, the public commissioner pays back the nominal principal to the investor plus a return for the financial risks they took. If not, the investors lose their investment. Hence, SIB model involves three distinctive characteristics: (1) focus on preventive interventions; (2) adoption of a Payment by Result contract; (3) development of a complex stakeholders network, including public and private organizations.

In the reference model, the government commissioner make an agreement with a private financing intermediary (i.e. the bond issuing organization), which agrees to provide up front capital to finance the delivery of a preventive social programs by service providers with a proven track. The intermediary gathers the operating funds by raising capital from one or more non-government, private investors; it uses the funds to support a service provider in reaching agreed social outcomes. An independent assessor is in charge of defining the evaluation methodology, assessing and reporting on the targeted outcomes. Indeed, only if the intervention is successful, i.e. the social program attains certain pre-defined social outcomes, the public sector is required to repay the intermediary. Then, the intermediary returns principal plus interest to investors. Contrarily, if the outcomes are not accomplished the investors do not regain their investment (Dagher, 2013; Fox & Albertson, 2012; Lehner & Nicholls, 2014; Liebman, 2013; Ragin & Palandjian, 2013; Warner, 2013).

This arrangement brings about some significant advantages of the SIB model compared to conventional methods to finance social services. First, the SIB model does not depend on Government or contractors for covering up-front costs of service provision, because this is up to the financial intermediary that collects funds from different kinds of investors. In this way, SIBs overcome, at least partially, the problem of constraints to the public funding and free service providers, in particular third sector organizations, from the need of performing fundraising activities (Fox & Alberston, 2011; Mulgan, 2010; Warner, 2013).

Second, the SIB model reshapes the relationships between the actors engaged in the commissioning of social services (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013; Palandjian & Hughes, 2014) and contribute to align the interests of multiple stakeholders with different backgrounds and mandates - government commissioners, third sector organizations, private organizations, financial intermediaries, investors (Charlton, Douglas, Flatau & Gill, 2013; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013). Thanks to this new network of relationships, SIBs can foster innovation, by leaving service providers free to design innovative intervention to achieve the expected social outcome, by exploiting synergies between different players, by restructuring the configuration of service delivery, by opening opportunities of cross-fertilization between different sectors of the public administration (Jackson, 2013; Social Finance Inc, 2012).
On the other hand, critics of SIB model have pointed up many challenges implied in the adoption of this instrument. First, the essential underpinning mechanism of SIB, i.e. the measurement of outcomes, cause for concerns since it could lead delivery organizations in focusing on those services whose outcomes determine payments (Disley & Rubin, 2014; McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield, & Donaldson, 2013) because are easier to measure or are more likely to succeed (Fox & Albertson, 2011). Furthermore, identifying a casual link between the program and its outcome is generally complicated and stakeholders are incentivized to manipulate outcomes measures (Jackson, 2013; Liebman, 2011;). Finally this layout could advance larger provider “at the expense of small, local and distinctive ones” (Dominey, 2012) by preferring those projects with proven track record since they can more likely secure large and certain social returns, thus limiting private investors’ risk (Fox & Alberston, 2012).

Also on the public agency side, the realization of cashable savings for the public agencies is contingent upon several factors and outcomes may not be clearly ascribable to one single agency’s budget (Fox & Alberston, 2011; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013). Moreover, the cost of capital of private investors is higher than government’s one and the complexity and expensiveness of this partnership may be not counterbalanced by enough benefits; consequently, financing directly a social intervention could be a more straightforward option for public administration (Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott & Shelupanov, 2011).

Therefore, given the above-mentioned requirements of SIB model to be applied, at the end of the day, few programs and populations could really have the necessary requisite for the SIB model to be employed (Jackson, 2013; Loder et al., 2011).

In reality, since 2010, when the first SIB Pilot (HMP Peterborough Social Impact Bond) was launched in UK, the reference organizations at international level (Center for Social Impact Bonds, 2013; G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014; Goodall, 2015) have recorded twenty-five SIBs commissioned in different countries, including UK, U.S., Australia, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. Only eight of them are currently in operation, whereas the others are in different phases of development (OCSE, 2014; Social Finance Ltd, 2014b). In addition, many countries, such as Malaysia, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Japan, France, Italy and Scotland are working on developing these schemes and a few international organizations (e.g. U.K. Department for International development; Instiglio; Inter-American Development Bank) are evaluating the use of the SIB paradigm to finance projects in Developing Countries such as India, Columbia, Mozambique, Uganda.

However, despite their growing diffusion and the favorable reaction of policy makers all around the world, it is worthy of noticing that SIBs cannot, and do not aim to, replace traditional methods to fund social projects. Even more important their feasibility and effectiveness can vary from case to case (Fox & Albertson, 2012; Liebman, 2011; Mulgan et al., 2010; Moynagh, 2010). This reason leads to the objectives of this investigation. Indeed, this analysis aims to assess the extent to which SIB model actually realizes its potential to overcome some of the shortcomings characterizing the public purchasing of social services. In particular, the objective of the study is twofold. First, it aims to produce a review of the experiences in which the SIB model has been already applied, exploring the specific configuration used (in terms of actors, financing structure, degree of innovation in the funded program). Second, it aims to verify whether the use of the SIB model has allowed to renovate and/or improve the social procurement mechanism and the purchasing relationship between public, not for profit and private sector; or, on the contrary, the SIB has been considered simply an additional channel to collect funding without enjoying the other potential benefits embedded in the model.

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After having briefly described what social impact bonds are, examining pros and cons generally related to their adoption, in the following section we outline the research approach. Then, to solve the above-mentioned objectives, we revise the existing SIB experiences at the international level, analyzing the configurations adopted, and linking these configurations to the societal challenge it intends to tackle and to the drivers for adoption (Section 3). Finally, we conclude in last section discussing the implications of this work from a policy and academic perspective.

Design and Methodology

The purpose of this work is to investigate the potential of SIB scheme in overcoming the shortcomings present in the public purchasing of social services. Hence, moving from the presentation of the pros and cons of the application of the SIB model, carried out in the previous paragraph, we now introduce the research approach, discussing how the review of the SIB experiences is carried out and how empirical material is analysed.

The methodology is articulated into four steps: (1) mapping of the SIB experiences implemented so far; (2) identification of the potential drivers at the basis of the choice of a public commissioner to develop a SIB; (3) definition of the dimensions that can be used to characterize a SIB configuration; (4) analysis of SIB experiences in order to single out any regular configuration pattern and to identify if such regularities are somehow related to the social issue addressed or to the different drivers that motivated the promotion of a SIB project. This last step allows drawing some conclusions about the ability of SIB scheme to reform the social procurement practice.

Mapping of SIB Experiences

The first step consists in the identification of the SIBs experiences implemented so far. To this aim, the mapping performed by Social Finance (Social Finance Ltd, 2014b) was used as a starting point since this body is generally considered a reference organization at international level. This initial mapping was completed through the analysis of other influential sources, including academic and practitioners literature such as consulting companies reports, technical working group and non governmental organizations active in this field and press releases. This process allowed identifying 6 further cases for whom it was possible to collect adequate information concerning the SIB structure. In details, we added two cases from Israel; three more cases from U.S.; one more case from the UK. The output of this process is reported in Table 1 that provides an exhaustive representation of SIB projects already in place or in the process of being implemented worldwide till February 2015. It includes 31 SIBs that have been initiated between 2010 and 2015 in eight countries (UK, U.S., Australia, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Israel and Germany) and that are currently in different stages of development.

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2 For this reason, we excluded from the analysis the SIB launched in Portugal (February 2015) and the seven SIBs launched (mid-March 2015) by UK Cabinet Office to help disadvantaged young people, children in care and those with long term health conditions and mental illness.

3 However, in the analysis, we decide to consider the DWP Innovation Fund for Young People as one case even if it consists of 10 SIBs.
Table 1: Analyzed SIB experiences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>SIB NAME</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
<th>INVESTOR TOTAL 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>HMP Peterborough</td>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>$ 7,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rikers Island</td>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>$ 9,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative</td>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>$ 21,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Street Impact</td>
<td>Rough sleeping</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>$ 7,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chronic Homeless - Social Innovation Financing MA</td>
<td>Rough sleeping</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>$ 3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Resilient Families Service SBB</td>
<td>Children and family care</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>$ 9,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Newpin NSW SBB</td>
<td>Children and family care</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>$ 6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>It's all about me Bond</td>
<td>Children and family care</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>GBP 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Manchester City Council Children in Care</td>
<td>Children and family care</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>GBP 1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Essex County Council</td>
<td>Children and family care</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>GBP 3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Children and family care</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>$ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Utah School Readiness Initiative</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>$ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dropout rates from higher education</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>ISRAEL</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chicago Child Parent Center</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>$ 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>DWP Innovation Fund for Young People 10 SIBs</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>GBP 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>New York State Social Impact Partnership</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5,5 years</td>
<td>$ 13,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Employment for young migrants Duo for a Job</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>€ 0,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Buzinezzclub</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>€ 0,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Millions.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>SIB NAME</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DURATION</th>
<th>INVESTOR TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Juvat</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bristol together</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>GBP 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Type 2 Diabetes</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>ISRAEL</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Fresno Asthma</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2 year (demonstration project)</td>
<td>$ 1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Driver For SIB Development

The second step consists in the identification of the drivers (reasons to adopt) that can explain the choice of developing a SIB, based on a review of the academic and practitioners’ literature. The examination of the benefits appointed to the SIB scheme by the literature (Jackson, 2013; Social Finance, 2014a) and of the expectations emerging from the public releases of the pioneering experiences (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013; Olson, 2012) has allowed to identify some recurring arguments which have been translated in three main drivers.

The first driver is the collection of additional funding for supporting the provision of additional services. A public sector commissioner can decide to appeal to private financing to overcome the lack of public funding and budgeting constraints (Fox & Albertson, 2012; Jackson, 2013;).

The second driver is the attempt to increase efficiency in using public resources and effectiveness in delivering social services. A public sector commissioner can choose to exploit the SIB structure in order to implement a financing mechanism that, being based on a payment by result contract, fosters efficiency in the provision of social services, since it allows to fund just what works (Liebman, 2011). This goes beyond the traditional rationale of public procurement in order to reengineering, and thus to increase the efficiency, of the public expenditure supply chain. At the same time, the commissioner may be driven by the opportunity to engage just with effective service providers and, even more, to enhance their effectiveness by giving them the possibility to experiment with highly innovative methods (Social Finance Ltd., 2009) or to use networks to improve the delivery of services.

The last driver is more supply-side oriented and refers to the possibility of offering new return opportunities for private investors (Loder et al., 2011). In this case, the focus is on the private sector, typically institutional or mainstream investors. The funding of social services is a market that has not previously been considered and that is now seen as a fertile field in terms of obtaining investment return, especially if compared to other traditional sectors already squeezed.

SIB Configurations

The third step consists in the identification of the dimensions characterizing a SIB experience, again based on a review of the academic and practitioners literature. To this aim, we refer to eight design dimensions that allow characterizing a SIB experience, again based on a review of the academic and practitioners literature:

1. **Coverage of a social issue**: this dimension refers to if and how a social issue is already addressed by existing services provided by the public sector. In particular, a SIB can address an area that is (1) uncovered by the public offerings, due to a lack of resources, (2) uncovered
by public offerings, since it is not a statutory service or (3) covered by the public offerings with poor outcomes or poor outreach.

2. Innovation of the program: this dimension describes the features of the social intervention financed by the SIB. A SIB can fund (1) a program that is totally new; (2) the implementation of a program whose underpinning principles (e.g. a specific therapy) have already been tested with a positive outcome, but it has not been implemented yet; (3) the expansion of an existing program that has already been implemented in prior cases.

3. Target area: this dimension specifies the geographical area targeted by a SIB. In details, an intervention funded by a SIB can be implemented at (1) local (city) level, (2) regional (county, State) level, (3) country level (nationwide).

4. Nature of the promoter: this dimension illustrates whether the SIB has been promoted by (1) the public administration at different government levels (State/National, Regional, Local…) or by (2) private organizations.

5. Involvement of the commissioner: this dimension addresses the role of the commissioner towards service providers and its level of control over the organizations involved in the SIB. This can result in (1) a high or low level (2) of involvement.

6. Flexibility of the delivery structure: this dimension deals with the relationship between service providers and between service provider/s and the delivery agency. The interactions among actors can lead to (1) flexible and collaborative arrangements, (2) arrangements with well-established boundaries and collaborative relationship and (3) arrangements with well-established boundaries and limited possibilities to activate collaborative processes among public and private operators.

7. Risk allocation: this dimension refers to the allocation of risk between the organizations involved in the SIB. In this connection, risk can be (1) bore by private investors or (2) distributed among different actors (public and private) through capital protection measures and risk sharing arrangements.

8. Distribution of potential savings: this dimension addresses the relationship between the potential savings generated by the intervention and the outcomes However, the relationship between public sector and third sector organizations is not without difficulties for both sides. payments made by the commissioner. It is important to understand if the cost savings generated by a SIB can be directly accrued to (1) one single Department, contributing to reduce a specific cost item, (2) more than one Departments, contributing to reduce a set of well defined cost items, (3) the overall community, but without a specific link to a precise cost item.

Analysis Of SIB Experiences

The fourth step consists in the analysis of the existing SIB experiences in the global scenario according to the above-described dimensions. The experiences analyzed include thirty-one SIBs in eight countries (UK, U.S., Australia, Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, Israel and Germany) in different stages of development.

Data analysis is aimed to identify possible relationships between the configuration chosen in each SIB, and (1) the social issue which it tries to solve (sectoral specificity); and (2) one or more drivers that have triggered its development.

To this aim, we first verify the coherence between a specific SIB configuration and a certain social issue, verifying if some configurations are recurrent in a certain field. The basic idea is to try to address the question: “Has a SIB taken this precise shape due to the inherent characteristics of the social problem it wants to tackle?” Coherently with this purpose, the
analysis of SIB cases has been organized in fields of application, i.e. the social issue the program funded by the SIB intends to tackle.

Second, we explore the consistency between each SIB configuration and the drivers for adoption. Indeed, at the base of the analysis, there is the hypothesis that all the above-mentioned drivers, and many others, coexist in triggering the creation of a SIB. Thus, we want to understand if the configuration of each SIB experience, resulting from the choice of involved actors about the different design dimensions, could better fulfill the needs linked to one specific driver.

In the next section, we try to verify if and how the employed SIB configuration has been affected by the social issue and the reasons of adoption and, lastly, if the resulting arrangement has the potential to innovate the practice of social procurement.

Findings

In this section, we outline the results of the analysis of the SIB experiences, based on the framework introduced in the previous section.

SIB pilots have touched many different areas, such as criminal justice, homeless, children and family care, education, unemployment and health, with significant points of contact among different cases.

First, the analysis highlights that SIBs are mostly used not to substitute another form of procurement for a specific social service; rather, they are intended to fund services in a previously uncovered social area, typically serving a target group which does not receive statutory services (e.g. health) or which, due to their specific features, is particularly expensive and difficult to help (e.g. unemployment). Furthermore, these experiences are mostly implemented on a small scale, in specific areas such as cities or regions (just two cases in the UK are nationwide or some U.S. SIBs target an entire federal state).

Second, in most of the analyzed cases, the public sector is the promoter of the use of a SIB. Indeed, we have identified just one case promoted by the not for profit sector and one from private investors (i.e. commercial banks). In addition, considering the relationship between the commissioning strategy and the distribution of potential savings, there is a prevalence of what we call a vertical perspective. It means that just one department or agency, usually the one in charge of the chosen social area, participates in the SIB despite the fact that the benefits that the social service funded by SIB may produce are wider, meaning they can be potentially enjoyed also by many other public agencies.

Lastly, the financial structure is sometimes arranged in order to extend the sharing of the risk to either the service provider or the commissioner. It is common that other actors of SIB, beyond the private investors, allocate some capital to fund the social intervention or bind their returns (e.g. the fees of the SIB designer) to the achievement of the social outcomes.

Table 2 summarizes the findings of the review of cases. It reports (1) the dimensions, which have been the most enlightening in analyzing the field; (2) the presence of a recurrent configuration; (3) if the dimensions of the recurrent design been affected by the inherent features of the desired social outcome; and, lastly, (4) if the employed configuration is consistent with the needs associated to a specific driver.
Table 2: Results from the SIBs’ analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>RELEVANT DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>IS THERE A REGULAR PATTERN IN DESIGN?</th>
<th>DOES THE SOCIAL ISSUE AFFECT THE DESIGN?</th>
<th>FULFILLMENT OF ONE DRIVER’S NEED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL JUSTICE</td>
<td>Innovation of the program</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility of delivery structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Causes relates different aspects of human life and services pertaining to different social areas</td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUGH SLEEPING</td>
<td>Coverage of the social issue</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation of the program</td>
<td></td>
<td>Causes relates different aspects of human life and services pertaining to different social areas</td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk Allocation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDREN AND FAMILY CARE</td>
<td>Nature of promoter</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>New return opportunities for private investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovation of the program</td>
<td>(for those commissioned by a public entity)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility of the delivery structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collection of additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collection of additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk Allocation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collection of additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>Innovation of the program</td>
<td>NO (Not comparable)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Collection of additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility of the delivery structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collection of additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collection of additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choice of the delivery structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of commissioner</td>
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<td>Risk Allocation</td>
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<td>Risk Allocation</td>
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**Table Notes:**
- **SECTOR**: The sector in which the SIB is implemented.
- **RELEVANT DIMENSIONS**: The dimensions relevant to the sector.
- **IS THERE A REGULAR PATTERN IN DESIGN?**: Whether there is a regular pattern in design.
- **DOES THE SOCIAL ISSUE AFFECT THE DESIGN?**: Whether the social issue affects the design.
- **FULFILLMENT OF ONE DRIVER’S NEED**: The fulfillment of one driver’s need.
As follows the presentation of the results is organized by field of application in order to highlight similarities and differences within a certain field.

Social Fields Analysis

Criminal Justice

The analysis of existing experiences highlights a recurrent configuration of SIB in the criminal justice sector. SIBs in this field generally address a new program, with an *ad hoc* social intervention that has its main strength in ensuring a high level of customization on the user’s need. The HMP Peterborough SIB, for instance, aims to build an individual action plan designed on each prisoner’s needs. In the Rikers Island SIB, the implemented intervention is a supplement to the regular academic program provided to adolescents in jail by the public sector and it employs an innovative therapy already successfully tested in other fields.

To this purpose, the delivery structure is configured as a network of different service providers, which are willing to collaborate and combine the different core activities in order to create an innovative intervention. Within this network, the delivery agency plays a leading role in overseeing project implementation, arranging project funding, distributing funds and managing repayment to funders. This is extremely evident in the HMP Peterborough SIB, where several actors are integrated under a unique “umbrella” program, named One Service, which engages different local service providers and a local manager. The latter is in charge of avoiding the rise of governance issues and assessing whether provided services meet the needs of the cohort members (Disley, Rubin, Scrags, Burrowes & Culley, 2011). This arrangement has been shaped to enable each provider to use its core competencies and activities to handle a precise step in the rehabilitation process. In the Rikers Island SIB, though there is not a unique umbrella, the delivery structure is based on a strong collaboration between the staff of the two not for profit providers and public agencies.
Another significant aspect of the SIB experiences in criminal justice relates the involvement of public commissioner that changes in the cases analyzed. In both U.S. SIBs, the public commissioner plays a strong role in the commissioning and designing of SIB by advocating new solutions from third sector organizations through a Request of Responses (Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative) and it has appointed both the SIB delivery agency and the social program to implement. Instead, in the HMP Peterborough SIB, the public commissioner has not even chosen the service providers and it has no direct relationship with any of them (Disley et al., 2011). However, in all three SIBs, the role of the delivery agency is crucial. The extreme example is that of Massachusetts SIB where the intermediary organization shares the risk by binding part of its fees to the achievement of results.

The choice of this configuration is apparently informed by the nature of the social issue that the intervention aims to solve. In both countries, UK and U.S., despite the previous effort, the reoffending rate has deemed still very high (Fox & Albertson, 2011; Social Finance Ltd, 2011). The Government has eventually recognized the rehabilitation of offenders as a complex and multifaceted problem that can be unlikely fulfilled by the government alone or by one single service provider (Fox & Albertson, 2011). Therefore, it has become clear that the implementation of new additional services is not enough, but it needs a paradigm shift towards structurally integrated efforts that help to tackle the root causes of the problem.

The specific configuration of these three dimensions – innovation of the program, flexibility of the delivery structure and involvement of public commissioner – enables a greater flexibility of the intervention in terms of possibility to change the program structure to answer to the user’s need and to leave the provider free to choose the right means to reach the agreed outcome. This opportunity answers to the need of public sector of shifting the paradigm of procurement from processes to outcomes (Fox & Albertson, 2011) and fostering efficiency in the use taxpayers’ money, which can be used to finance just “what works”. In addition, especially the design of UK and New York SIB allows exploring new forms of engagement with and between the service providers, fulfilling the need of selecting effective service providers.

We can conclude that, in the field of criminal justice, the instrument of SIB has been actually thought and consequently structured in order to reform the commissioning of social programs.

Rough Sleeping

Despite several points of contact, the SIBs that try to solve the problem of rough sleeping, do not present a recurring configuration. As follows, we discuss the main dimensions that are particularly interesting for these SIBs, highlighting different design choices made in case analyzed.

The first dimension is the coverage of the social issue. It has strongly affected the structure of London SIB, since the local authority has realized that the outline of existing services – which were very fragmented because the interventions are offered by the different boroughs of London (Social Finance Inc., 2012) – inhibits their effectiveness. Therefore, the poor outcomes in helping rough sleepers have been ascribed to a mismatch between the characteristics of the social problem and the design of the existing social services. The SIB has been looked at as a possible way to enact a coordination structure for the existing services improving the matching between service provision and the users’ needs (Social Finance Inc., 2012).

The second relevant dimension is the innovation of the program, which helps in highlighting the level of customization of the service to the users’ needs. The London SIB is
based exactly on the idea of providing an individualized support to users to enable them to access to existing services. In this case, no additional service has been implemented to tackle rough sleeping, but the program helps rough sleepers to choose the “right mix” of pre-existing services and access to them. On the other hand, in the SIB implemented in Massachusetts it is more evident the desire to adopt a “preventive approach”, since it finances the expansion of a program based on the “Housing First” model, already implemented by The Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance.

A first point of contact between different SIBs in this field is the strong role played by the public commissioner. These SIBs are part of a broader action of the public administration (The Mayor’s Rough Sleeping Commissioning Framework as for London SIB and Massachusetts Social Innovation Financing). The Great London Authority has entered into a contract directly with one of the service provider, whereas the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has issued a competitive process to procure both the delivery agency and the service providers separately.

Another point of contact is the structure of risk allocation of these SIBs: in both cases, the service provider shares the risk with the investors by providing a part of the capital.

In conclusion, the SIBs in this field are not structured according to a common design. However, both configurations seem to be able to fulfill the needs embedded in the same driver – i.e. increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of social services.

They both allow testing possible ways to renew the purchasing relationship between public sector and not for profit organizations. Indeed, the SIB commissioned by the Greater London Authority, created explicitly to coordinate and systemize the existing programs and service providers, made the provision chain more effective. The Massachusetts SIB may pave the path for a new and more effective model of public-private engagement, given the way in which the government arranged the commissioning process – issuing an open and competitive request of solutions from third sector organizations and appointing a service provider which is also the lead actor and shares part of the risk.

Family And Children Care

The social issue relating to children’s care and their relationship with family has received much attention as target of outcome-based contracts, with high variations in the specific configurations adopted. In particular, the entity that promotes the SIB varies from case to case and there are also two SIBs promoted by organizations other than a public sector agency. Benevolent Society Social Benefit Bond has been promoted by private entities and It’s all about me Adoption Bond has been created and led entirely by the voluntary sector.

These two are the only SIBs exceeding the recurring configuration, which instead characterizes all the other SIBs in this area. These latter are those SIBs that are supported by a public entity and target the problem of children at risk of care.

The SIBs in this sector mainly consist in the expansion, in terms of outreach, or replication of an existing program, sometimes in the form of building new physical infrastructures (Newpin NSW Social Benefit Bond and Saskatoon SIB). The examples of Newpin NSW Social Benefit Bond and the Saskatoon SIB in Canada are particularly illustrative of this dimension.

The delivery structure involves a direct relationship between the public commissioner and the service provider (e.g. Newpin NSW Social Benefit Bond, Manchester City Council Children in Care SIB and Saskatoon SIB). Furthermore, the public commissioner appears to be the lead actor in these SIB experiences, contributing in different ways. It provides a financial guarantee to lower the risk and pays part of the costs the service provider incurs through a standing charge (Newpin SBB); it presents the SIB as a component of a broader public strategy (Essex City Council SIB); or it commits dedicated staff and officers of the
organization to the project (Manchester City Council SIB). This choice can be explained by
the need of managing this specific social service locally, thus the prominent role of the local
authorities.

The resulting outline, in the end, seems to reflect the interests of local authorities to
overcome capital constrains. On one hand, this configuration allows to exploit a new source
of capital, incrementing the available funding for the local authority to support the execution
of new preventive programs (aiming the avoid children enter into residential care) whose
efficacy has in some way already been tested. On the other hand, it allows the public authority
to maintain control over the service provision, without huge changes to the provision chain
(considering the direct relationship with service providers, in one case even in the form of the
payment a standing charge for the service).

Comparing this outline against It’s all about me Bond, which exceed the prevalent
configuration, sheds the light on the two different functions the SIB may play: in the first case,
the use of this scheme just provide new capital to finance social services; in the second one,
SIB was born exactly in order to try to overturn the mainstream logic of adoption, changing
the traditional activities performed by the actors in the service provision value chain.

Education

In the field of education, there are three SIB experiences: the Utah School Readiness Initiative
SIB, a similar new example in Chicago and Israel Dropout rates from higher education.

However, the comparability of these cases is limited by the fact they intervene to solve
two very different concerns – pre-school readiness and school dropout, adopting a different
configuration.

As concerns the innovation of the program, the Utah SIB provides the needed funds to
expand the outreach of a program that, despite the presence of a further demand (many
children remained on waiting lists), has so far operated just on a small scale, in a public
district school, due to the lack of capital. Whereas, the Israeli SIB, aiming to reduce
dropout rate in higher education, addresses a category of services – supporting services in
higher education – that typically falls outside the government duties.

As for the involvement of public commissioner and flexibility of the delivery structure,
in the first two cases (Utah and Chicago SIBs) the program is directly delivered in public
schools and there is a delivery agency (United Way of Salt Lake and IFF) in charge of
managing the repayment to investors. While, in the second case, the public commissioner is
just indirectly involved through the academic institution: indeed, the payments to investors
rely upon the increased income that the university earns from the additional fees of students
that remain enrolled thanks to the services financed by the SIB.

Therefore, considering the innovation of the program and the flexibility of the delivery
structure, the configurations of SIBs implemented so far in the education sector do not brings
any relevant innovations in terms of restructuring the service delivery model; they just
provide additional funding to enable the delivery of services.

Unemployment

The social issue relating to unemployment has witnessed the highest number (fifteen out of
thirty-one) of SIB experiences.

In this field, the analysis highlights two main configurations: the first one aiming to
increase the funding available and the second one aiming to innovate the social service
provision chain.
As for the first group, the funded interventions (nature of the program) are typically the expansion of already implemented programs (New York State Social Impact Partnership, Duo for a Job SIB) or new programs carried out by successful and established service providers (Buzzineclub SIB, Juvat SIB, Bristol Together SIB, DWP Innovation Fund SIB). Moreover, they are all implemented at a local level (city or region).

In the delivery structure, there have been little attempts to innovate: for example, the service provider Duo for a Job acts also as the delivery agency; or in two cases, the service providers - Buzzineclub and Bristol Together - are configured as an enterprise, which generates a yield if the program is successful (Tomkinson, 2014).

Another feature worthy of being highlighted concerns the coverage of the social issue. These cases mainly target specific vulnerable categories such as migrants, ex-prisoners, young at risk of disadvantage, “Not in Education, Employment or Training” young, whose needs are typically expensive and difficult to serve. Hence, these SIBs intervene in a social area left uncovered by the public sector due to the specific needs of these groups.

The second group of SIBs (DWP Innovation Fund SIB and Juvat SIB) shows some elements, which can potentially spur innovation in the procurement practice. Though they share with the previous group the feature of targeting specific vulnerable groups, they introduce an innovative engagement model with service providers (flexibility of the delivery structure). DWP Innovation Fund relies on an open competition based on a list of payable outcomes published by the DWP: bidders can “pick and mix from this list” and they can propose the payments associated to each proxy outcome (Center for Social Impact Bonds, 2013). In this way, the SIB has been able to exploit several innovative social investment models (Social Finance Ltd, 2013): within the same project, the commissioner has experimented three different ways of engaging with the service provider - single investor, multiple investor and intermediary models. The Juvat SIB engages four service providers bringing “together target group-specific program modules” from different social areas (Juvat, SIB Fact Sheet). Moreover, just non-profit financiers invest in the project.

To sum up, in the first stream, all SIBs are designed to collect funds to expand or implement services that target a group of unemployed people with peculiar needs that are not addressed by other public initiatives. In front of the progressive budget cutbacks, public commissioners are pushed to contract with not for profit service providers, which already have the expertise to deal with a specific group of unemployed people using up front capital from private investors. In this way, they to serve these specific groups, while saving the capital which should have been used to develop additional competencies.

On the other hand, the second group introduces different arrangements whereby public and nonprofit organizations work together. In this way, the DWP Innovation Fund SIB, which has succeed in engaging several service providers employing an ad hoc model for each one, proves the ability of the SIB scheme to test innovative models in the purchasing of social services.

Health

SIBs in the health field have generally the purpose to intervene on the causes of a disease to prevent its appearance and, thus, avoid emergency health cost for the public sector.

As for the innovation of the program, the SIB mechanism helps to implement previously non-existing preventive programs that aim to tackle the causes of a specific disease whose duties and funds are diverted from remedial services. For example, the Israel Type 2 Diabetes SIB intends to fund a program that promotes a healthy life style between high-risk pre-diabetic individuals.
This is particularly interesting, since in these cases the causal nexus between the effects of the intervention and the potential savings is quite simple because savings are linked to the avoided disease-related medical expenses and emergency treatment.

Lastly, in both cases, the public sector does not appear as the driving force of the SIB - even if this assumption may be biased by limited availability of information about these experiences.

The health sector itself seems a fertile area for the application of the SIB model in particular considering the preventive nature associated to the SIB structure. Indeed, for some diseases it is quite easy to identify the factors that cause them, and consequently intervene on them. However, the State is not required to provide this kind of services and, given the budget constraints, it is not even willing.

Finally, considering the relative simplicity in accounting the savings for the public agency and that no other relevant changes have been arranged, the SIBs just allow the public sector to provide a service, which instead would not be delivered, and at the same time save some money thanks to those preventive interventions.

Conclusion

The hype that globally has encompassed SIB model, and its potential benefits for both public and not for profit sector, clashes with the many hurdles that developers should face in shaping this instrument.

Therefore, it seemed relevant investigate when it is worthwhile for the different players engaged in the provision of social services to get involved in the arrangement of this mechanism and what are the factors (in particular which social issue and which public sector requirement) that make the SIB a feasible mean to improve the purchasing and delivery of social services. To this aim, we revised the configuration employed in all SIB experiences developed so far in order to verify when the SIB model has allowed to renovate the social procurement practice or when it has been simply considered an additional channel to collect funding without enjoying the other potential benefits embedded in the model.

The scant empirical data available so far are certainly not enough to fully answer these questions, but we are already able to draw some insights that might be useful to potential SIB developers.

First, the investigation has allowed identifying some external elements that affect the shaping of SIB configuration. The first factor taken in consideration has been the social problem that the intervention, funded through the SIB, wants to address. In this sense, the review of SIBs experiences enacted worldwide reveals that the inherent characteristics and the pre-existing level of coverage of the social problems contribute to shape the SIB configuration. Furthermore, just two fields show a variance in terms of ability of SIB’s configuration to fulfil the needs of a specific driver (care of children and unemployment). This finding supports the hypothesis that SIB configuration is highly affected by the social issue it wants to solve.

The second aspect that has been analyzed is the coherence between the configuration and the needs associated with one of three identified drivers – collection of additional funding, increasing the efficiency in using public resources and effectiveness in the delivery of social services and find a return opportunity for private investors – in order to ultimately understand whether the use of SIB mechanisms contributed to reform the procurement practice. The analysis of existing SIBs discloses that the prevailing structure in the several fields is rarely able to fulfil the need to improve or revolutionize the provision chain of social services; rather,
in the major part of fields the configuration is intended to implement new services or expand the program of service providers with proven track record. This reminds back the concern about the balance between the advantages of SIB and its complexity and expensiveness. Does it make sense for policy makers to employ this instrument since they cannot exploit the benefits of going beyond the traditional logic of public procurement for reengineering, and thus increasing the efficiency, of the public expenditure supply chain?

The critical review, despite being preliminary, allows to formulate the following advices that should be considered in the structuring process of a SIB. SIB promoters should set their expectations towards the employment of this new instrument from the beginning; the above-presented drivers are just three examples out of a broad range of possibilities. Lastly, they should carefully evaluate the social field in which implemented the SIB; and, third, they should consider which players include. These factors, highly affecting the SIB structure, also condition their level of control over the provision of services.

The academic literature on this theme is still very scanty, since practitioners have developed a large part of the debate. Providing a comprehensive and illustrative survey of the few seminal experiences at world level and highlighting issues that might be crucial in structuring a Social Impact Bond, as this explorative work tried to perform, is a first necessary effort. In order to support the development of SIB market, it would be important to conduct further research on larger scale when, and if, more data will be available. In addition, it should be important continue to record the diffusion of SIBs over time and to check the emergence of other fundamental lessons that may inform SIB developers. Lastly, it would be interesting to do a cross-country analysis, which allows deepening the already emerging country-specific influences in order to understand the extent to which much the peculiarities of a country in terms of legal, economic, political and cultural background affected the arrangement of SIB.

References


### Characteristics of the configuration of a Social Impact Bond

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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>SIB</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SOCIAL ISSUE</th>
<th>COVERAGE OF THE SOCIAL ISSUE</th>
<th>INNOVATION OF THE PROGRAM</th>
<th>TARGET AREA</th>
<th>NATURE OF PROMOTER</th>
<th>INVOLVEMENT OF COMMISSIONER</th>
<th>FLEXIBILITY OF DELIVERY STRUCTURE</th>
<th>RISK ALLOCATION</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Uncovered since it is not a statutory service</td>
<td>New program</td>
<td>Local</td>
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<td>Low level of involvement</td>
<td>Flexible and collaborative</td>
<td>All risk on investors</td>
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<td>Presence of capital protection measures</td>
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<td>BELGIUM</td>
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<td>Uncovered by the public offerings</td>
<td>Expansion of an existing program</td>
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<td>Public – Local Level</td>
<td>Low level of involvement</td>
<td>Stand-alone program</td>
<td>All risk on investors</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
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<td>SIB</td>
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<td>SOCIAL ISSUE</td>
<td>COVERAGE OF THE SOCIAL ISSUE</td>
<td>INNOVATION OF THE PROGRAM</td>
<td>TARGET AREA</td>
<td>NATURE OF PROMOTER</td>
<td>INVOLVEMENT OF COMMISSIONER</td>
<td>FLEXIBILITY OF DELIVERY STRUCTURE</td>
<td>RISK ALLOCATION</td>
<td>DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS</td>
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